SYMPOSIUM
Some Scholarly Consensus:

Modernization of the Antitrust Laws Is
Generally Best Left to the Judiciary
By JOSHUA P. DAVIs*

THIS

ISSUE of the University of San Francisco Law Review follows a
symposium held at the University of San Francisco School of Law on
the Antitrust Modernization Commission ("AMC"). Formed by an Act
of Congress in 2002, the AMC is charged with examining whether
there is a need to modernize the antitrust laws, to identify particular
issues of study, to solicit the views of those affected by the antitrust
laws, and to prepare and submit a report to Congress and the President.1 The symposium was a wonderful success, benefiting from the
participation of renowned scholars, sophisticated practitioners, important government officials, and, notably, one of the members of the
AMC, Commissioner W. Stephen Cannon.
The symposium was held because the winds of change seemed to
be stirring in the world of federal antitrust law. The AMC augured a
possible significant shift in how the federal government regulates markets. But, to extend the metaphor, the weather itself may have
changed since its formation. Indeed, whether the AMC will result in
any significant reform is becoming increasingly unclear. It may in the
end have little effect.
One reason making significant reform unlikely is pragmatic; the
federal government is otherwise occupied. When Congress passed the
Antitrust Modernization Commission Act, Republican control of the
legislative and executive branches held the potential for simultaneous
* Professor of Law, U.S.F. School of Law. I would like to thank David W. Scopp and
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resulted in this issue of the University of San FranciscoLaw Review.
1. Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273,
§§ 11051-60, 116 Stat. 1856 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 note).
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legislation on various matters. With the Bush Administration's recent
struggles-in reforming Social Security, in organizing prescription
drug benefits as part of Medicare, in contending with the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, in grappling with the occupation of Iraq, and in
addressing nuclear threats in North Korea and Iran, to identify but a
few key issues-suddenly political capital seems scarce. Thus, although businesses that support the current Administration may well
want to amend the laws that govern competition, inertia may win the
day. Whether they are seeking to insulate themselves from the discipline of the free market, or merely attempting to prune back laws that
create inefficiencies, the reality is that the federal government has
many problems to solve. Modifying the federal antitrust laws is unlikely to be high on any politician's list of priorities.
A second reason the AMC may be unlikely to achieve reform is
that it may not be attempting to do so in the best way. In particular, it
is not at all clear that the best agent of change in antitrust doctrine is
the legislature. The judiciary, instead, may be ideally suited for updating the antitrust laws, which it has been doing for many decades
through a common law process. The antitrust laws, by their nature,
leave courts room to modify doctrine as appropriate. The relevant
statutes are relatively brief-much like our Constitution-and have
been interpreted as embodying a relatively simple set of principles,
which enable courts to adapt doctrine to changing circumstances. Indeed, despite origins in a populist concern for small businesses, the
courts have reached a rare consensus about the primary underlying
aim of the antitrust laws: the pursuit of efficiency, as that concept has
been defined by economists. According to the courts, free competition in general promotes efficiency, creating incentives to satisfy the
desires of consumers as inexpensively as possible. And, as Professor
Hovenkamp argued at a previous symposium 2 at the University of San
Francisco School of Law, the courts have proven reasonably good at
formulating and modifying doctrine to give content to the general
terms of the antitrust laws, and at reading narrowly legislation Congress has passed in response to special interest groups. 3 Federal antitrust law is essentially a common law field with statutory authorization.
And change-or, if you will, modernization-is integral to common
law decision-making.
2. Symposium, Soaring Pricesfor PrescriptionDrugs:Just Rewards for Innovations or Antitrust Violations?, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (2004).
3. Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition, 39

U.S.F. L. REv. 11, 12-14 (2004).
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It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that, as Albert A. Foer discusses
in his article in this symposium issue, Half-Time at the Antitrust Modernization Commission, numerous blue-ribbon commissions have been
formed in the past to address antitrust law, few of them led to immediate change, and the fate of the AMC may well be the same. Foer offers
a useful analysis of the AMC's work to date, placing its efforts in a
broader historical and political context. One implication of his analysis is that the AMC is unlikely to lead to a sudden, radical departure
from traditional antitrust principles.
It is similarly unsurprising that two other authors of articles in the
symposium issue of the law review argue againstsignificant changes to
the relief currently available under the federal statutory antitrust regime. Professor Robert H. Lande's article, Five Myths About Antitrust
Damages, addresses the statutory provision that provides treble damages in private civil actions. The predicate for his argument is that, in
practice, the nominal award of treble damages deters potential violators of antitrust laws as if the remedy were, at most, single damages.
This is so in light of various limitations on private antitrust damages,
including that they do not allow recovery of prejudgment interest, recovery for allocative inefficiency, or recovery for the "umbrella effects"
of market power, as well as the reality that many violators will not get
caught. Meanwhile, Professor Lande contends, courts often make informal adjustments to decrease damages because they have doubts
that treble damages are appropriate. Professor Lande makes the ultimate conclusion: private civil damages in antitrust cases should remain as they are, and, if any change should occur, it should be that
courts stop adjusting other doctrines to make antitrust cases especially
difficult for plaintiffs.
Professor Stephen Calkins in Civil Monetary Remedies Available to
FederalAntitrust Enforcersreaches similar conclusions in addressing the
remedies available to the federal government in antitrust cases. In particular, he analyzes (1) whether the Federal Trade Commission
should retain the power to seek monetary equitable relief for those
harmed by antitrust violations (worried about under-deterrence, he
argues against change) and (2) whether the Department of Justice
should be authorized to impose civil fines or penalties (for the same
reason, he tentatively suggests such authority be granted as an intermediate choice between a mere civil injunction and criminal liability).
Note that Professor Calkins's main argument is against reform, that
his proposal for change is modest and tentative, and that it is on an
issue that the courts cannot address themselves through the common
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law process. Only Congress can authorize a new remedy under the
federal antitrust statute.
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp in Federalism and Antitrust Reform
also argues for the most part in favor of only tinkering with, not transforming, the status quo. Specifically, he recommends adjusting, but
not changing radically, the background rules for determining when
state action immunizes private actors from antitrust liability. He does
make one proposal for substantial change, but even there it is not to
alter antitrust law as it has developed through a common law process,
but rather to undo a legislative incursion into the federal antitrust regime. This proposal is to repeal the immunity from the antitrust laws
that the McCarran-Ferguson Act 4 confers on the insurance industry.
More generally, Hovenkamp's position is that courts should be somewhat skeptical of state approval of anti-competitive schemes and
should not be uncritical in allowing state action to serve as a smokescreen for private collusion. According to Hovenkamp, a special exemption to the federal antitrust laws should arise only if a state clearly
authorizes and actively supervises private behavior. In other words, according to Hovenkamp, in the great majority of cases the rules governing competition as developed through a common law process
should not be set aside because of a political decision by a state
government.
Perhaps the most dramatic proposal in this symposium issue
comes from two state attorneys general, J. Thomas Prud'homme and
Ellen S. Cooper, One More Challengefor the AMC: Repairingthe Legacy of
Illinois Brick. They argue for a repeal of the "direct purchaser rule"
established in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,5 which allows only purchasers
who buy goods or services directly from a violator of the antitrust laws
to seek a monetary recovery under federal antitrust law. 6 Related is
the Supreme Court's rejection of any "pass on defense" in Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,7 which allows direct purchasers to recover the full overcharge they pay on goods or services as a
result of an antitrust violation, even if they pass some of the overcharge down the chain of distribution . Prud'homme and Cooper
make in essence two arguments: first, Illinois Brick should be over4.
5.
6.
ing the
7.
8.

McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (2000).
431 U.S. 720 (1977).
Loeb Indus., Inc. v. Sumitomo Corp., 306 F.3d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 2002) (describ"Direct Purchaser Rule"), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 903 (2003).
392 U.S. 491 (1968).
See id. at 494.
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ruled, allowing indirect purchasers to bring damages actions under
federal antitrust law; and, second, this change should be made
through legislation.
There is some basis for believing that the federal courts would
not be ideally suited to revisit and revise Illinois Brick. If Illinois Brick
was in fact wrongly decided, one reason may have been that the federal courts were swayed by self-interest. Illinois Brick, along with Hanover Shoe, simplified federal antitrust cases. Together these decisions
spared federal courts from having to calculate the amount of damages, if any, suffered by purchasers at each link in the sometimes
lengthy chain of distribution. As Prud'homme and Cooper point out,
federal courts will no longer have this luxury, as various states have
adopted indirect purchaser statutes, and Congress recently enacted
the Class Action Fairness Act, 9 which creates federal subject matter
jurisdiction over many class actions that are based on state law, 10 and
that, in the past, would have been litigated in state court. Perhaps this
new circumstance will spur the federal courts to reconsider Illinois
Brick and Hanover Shoe.
Even though the judgment of the federal courts in formulating
and modifying antitrust doctrine is not beyond reproach, particularly
when it comes to Illinois Brick, Prud'homme and Cooper's analysis
gives rise to concerns about legislative intervention. As their article
recognizes, the interaction is complex between the direct purchaser
rule and any pass on defense. The ideal way to deal with that complexity will depend on practical issues, many of which will come to light
only through litigation. The authors attempt to address some of these
issues, but, understandably, their analysis raises far more questions
than it provides answers. Congress is not well-suited to anticipate the
practical issues that will arise from any change in Illinois Brick. Nor is it
built to resolve them in a way that serves the underlying purposes of
the antitrust laws, as opposed to the interests of powerful lobbying
groups that wish to avoid the discipline of free markets. Thus, even
assuming that reform of Illinois Brick is appropriate, the collective wisdom of the contributors to this symposium issue of the University of
San Francisco Law Review seems to suggest that that effort should be
left, in whole or in part, to the courts.
This symposium issue of the University of San FranciscoLaw Review,
then, may be greater than the sum of its parts. Each of the articles
9.
10.

28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
See id.
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provides insights on an important topic in antitrust law. Taken together, the articles suggest a presumption in favor of leaving the development of antitrust law to courts, even if Congress has the will to
act.

